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I. INTRODUCTION
On March 23, 2010, President Barack Obama signed the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (ACA), which represents the most significant regulatory overhaul
of the United States healthcare system since the 1965 Social Security Amendments,
establishing Medicare and Medicaid.1 By 2020 healthcare is expected to account for
twenty percent of the Nation’s economy, making it one of the most important economic
issues facing Americans.2 Irrespective of race, gender, or socioeconomic status,
healthcare is a reality that all individuals must face at some point in their lives.
The ACA was enacted as an effort to address the overwhelming disparities that exist
with regards to the access to and affordability of healthcare in the United States.3 The
law’s provisions, including the Hospital Readmission Reduction Program (HRRP),
take substantive steps that are intended to work towards mitigating these shortcomings.
Using readmission rates as its metric of quality, the HRRP imposes a penalty on any
hospital that exceeds the national mean readmission rate within a particular year.4 These
penalties are collected from hospitals through a percentage reduction in the annual
Medicare payments they receive for inpatient service claims.5 The expectation is that
hospitals will respond to this incentive by improving operational process and patient
care in a manner that will benefit all hospital patients.6 This article argues, however, that
this incentive system is flawed, as readmission rates are not an accurate way to evaluate
a hospital’s performance because they are not useful indicators of quality of care.7
Moreover, in practice, the HRRP may have at least three unintended consequences: a
decrease in quality of care, a decrease in access to care for minorities, and an increase
in hospital financial distress.8

1

Julia Balch Samora et al., Where the Candidates Stand on Health Care, Am. Acad. of Orthopedic
Surgeons (Jan. 2014), http://www.aaos.org/news/aaosnow/oct12/advocacy2.asp.
2

Ricardo Alonso-ZaldivarI, Health Care Costs to Account For One-Fifth Of U.S. Economy
By 2020: Report, Huffington Post (July 28, 2011, 11:17 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/2011/07/28/health-care-costs-economy-us_n_911917.html.
3

See generally Mary Naylor, Unintended Consequences of Steps to Cut Readmissions and Reform
Payment May Threaten Care of Vulnerable Older Adults, Health Aff. 1623 (July 2011).
4

Id.

5

Julia James, Medicare Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program: To Improve Care and
Lower Costs, Medicare Imposes a Financial Penalty on Hospitals with Excess Readmissions,
Health Aff. 3 (Apr. 2014), available at http://healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief_pdfs/
healthpolicybrief_102.pdf.
6

Elizabeth H. Bradley, Leslie Curry, Leora I. Horwitz et al., Hospital Strategies Associated with
30-Day Readmission Rates for Patients with Heart Failure, Circulation: Cardiovascular Quality
and Outcomes (June 2013), available at http://www.medpagetoday.com/upload/2013/7/16/Circ%20
Cardiovasc%20Qual%20Outcomes-2013-Bradley-444-50.pdf.
7

Sharon Silow-Carroll, Jennifer N. Edwards, Aimee Lashbrook et al., Reducing Hospital
Readmissions: Lessons from Top-Performing Hospitals, The Commonwealth Fund 3 (Apr. 2011),
available at http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/Files/Publications/Case%20Study/2011/
Apr/1473_SilowCarroll_readmissions_synthesis_web_version.pdf.
8

Joel D. Sweider, Note, A Dose of Reality: Unintended Consequences of Penalizing Hospital
Readmissions in the PPACA, 9 Ind. Health L. Rev. 361, 363 (2011).
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II. BACKGROUND
Hospital readmission is a relatively broad, yet simple concept: a patient, upon initial
discharge from a hospital, is shortly thereafter readmitted to the same or different hospital
for the same or a different condition.9 Within the context of Medicare, readmissions
have generally been measured within thirty-days of initial discharge.10 According to a
2009 study in the New England Journal of Medicine, almost one fifth of hospitalized
Medicare patients are readmitted within that thirty-day window.11 Furthermore, more
than sixty-seven percent of patients discharged following a hospitalization for a medical
condition and fifty-one percent of those discharged after undergoing surgical procedures
were readmitted or died within a year.12 The primary problem with readmitting a patient
is that it may be indicative of poor care or an inefficient coordination of post-discharge
care.13 For example, research has suggested that excessive readmission can be reduced
by enhanced communication between caregivers and patients and better coordination of
post-discharge care.14
As an incentive based system, the intended purpose of HRRP is to encourage hospitals
to adopt strategies that better improve patient services and operating practices;15
however, this objective is based on the faulty premise that readmission rates are solely
reflective of the quality of care provided by hospitals.16 In 2000, a survey of some
nineteen readmission studies, carried out over the previous ten-years, concluded that
most readmissions seem to be caused by modifiable causes and that global readmission
rates are not useful indicators of quality of care.17 As such, using readmissions as a
yardstick to evaluate the quality of healthcare provided by a hospital becomes inherently
problematic. There are many factors that are not related to quality of care, such as socioeconomic status of patients that nonetheless influence readmission rates.18
Indiscriminately imposing penalties on hospitals with excess readmission rates, without
accounting for the contributing factors for those readmissions, may adversely impact
hospitals, particularly hospitals that serve large populations of individuals from low

9
10

Id. at 365.
Id. at 363.

11

Stephen F. Jencks et al., Rehospitalizations Among Patients in the Medicare Fee-for-Service
Program, 360 New Eng. J. Med. 1418, 1426 (2009).
12

Id. at 1421.

13

See generally Sweider, supra note 8, at 366 (discussing how excess readmission rates may
indicate poor care or missed opportunities to better coordinate care).
14

See id. 365 (noting that enhanced communication between caregivers and patients has a direct
correlation with a reduction of readmission rates).
15

See generally Naylor, supra note 3, at 1623 (discussing the overall purpose of HHRP is to
improve the quality of service hospitals provide to their patients).
16

Id.

17

Jochanan Benbassat & Mark Taragin, Hospital Readmissions as a Measure of Quality of Health
Care: Advantages and Limitations, 160 Archives Internal Med. 1074, 1074 (2000).
18

James, supra note 5, at 3 (arguing that an emphasis on readmission rates to improve quality of
care is a flawed strategy because readmissions are tied into factors outside of a hospitals’ control).
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socio-economic backgrounds.19 Readmissions tend to be higher in hospitals that treat
a great proportion of indigent patients, since there is a direct correlation between lower
socio-economic conditions and overall poor health.20 Hospitals that treat primarily
these types of patients are most susceptible to the financial hardships that the penalties
associated with the HRRP could potentially create.21 This is particularly problematic
because many of these hospitals are already reliant on federal aid to maintain operation
since many of their patients are uninsured.22 If these hospitals are penalized for
readmissions then they will experience increased financial pressure, leading to cuts
in patient services and other efforts to minimize costs, harming the entire community
served by the hospital.23 Moreover, the need to reduce readmissions will create a conflict
of interest between quality of care delivered and the hospital’s bottom line.24
A. The HRRP Will Increase the Level of Financial Distress Experienced by
Some Hospitals and in Turn Decrease Access to Care by Socio-Economically
Disadvantaged Groups
The HRRP was designed in a manner that will disproportionally impact hospitals in
urban neighborhoods that treat socio-economically disadvantaged groups, including
indigent and uninsured patients.25 With limited funding and fewer resources, the
financial implications that these penalties will have on such safety-net hospitals cannot
be dismissed.
While many readmissions can be easily avoided by implementing simple changes in
patient discharge procedures, many of the underlying causes of readmissions involve
factors that are beyond the hospital’s control, including patient behavior, poor followup, and the socio-economic status of the patient population.26 The computation used by
the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) sets a readmission threshold
for each hospital, and the hospital is subsequently penalized whenever they exceed this
threshold.27 Since the methodology used by the DHHS to compute excess readmission
rates do not adjust for factors that can impact readmission rates, hospitals become
victims of their surroundings.28
19

See generally Sweider, supra note 8, at 364 (noting that since there is a direct correlation
between lower socio-economic conditions and poor population health conditions, hospitals that treat
these patients will have a higher readmission rate more often than others).
20

James, supra note 5, at 3.

21

Id.

22

Christie Provost Peters, The Basics: Medicaid Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) Payments,
Nat’l Health Policy Forum 1 (2009), available at http://www.nhpf.org/library/the-basics/Basics
DSH 06-15-09.pdf.
23

Id.

24

Amanda Bronstad, Suit Over Hospital’s Closure Could be a Harbinger, Nat’l L. J. (Aug. 23,
2010), http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202470936728&slreturn=1&hbxlog
in=1#.
25

See generally Sweider, supra note 8, at 364.

26

James, supra note 5, at 4.

27

Hospital Compare, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., http://www.hospital compare.hhs.
gov/ (last updated Jan. 26, 2012).
28

James, supra note 5, at 4.
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i. Many of the Readmission Reduction Strategies are Impractical or too Costly for
Hospitals to Implement.
While the ACA lays out a number of readmission reduction strategies for hospitals to
implement, the success of these strategies do not necessarily translate from hospital-tohospital.29 Furthermore, a number of the strategies are simply not feasible for hospitals
with limited resources and uninsured patients.30 For example, many patients at large
inner city hospitals are readmitted because they do not always follow the nurse’s or
physician’s discharge instructions usually because they lack the resources to do so.31
To ameliorate this phenomenon, hospitals could implement regimented follow-ups
by nurses,32 but this strategy is very costly and such expenditure would serve as a
misappropriation of resources.
ii. There are Underlying, Non-Care Related, Causes for Readmission.
Hospitals that are frequented by a high proportion of uninsured patients are generally
referred to as safety-net hospitals. These hospitals are typically found in low-income
communities, where many of our nation’s health and economic disparities are present.
In adherence with federal law, a hospital must treat a patient in need of care regardless
of insurance status.33
One of the reasons that many patients are readmitted to safety-net hospitals is related to
an inability to afford their prescriptions, rather than the underlying care that the patient
received while in that hospital.34 Take for instance a patient admitted to a hospital with a
laceration to the hand that requires stitches. The patient is treated and released from the
hospital with a prescription for antibiotics. However, the patient is uninsured and cannot
afford to fill the prescription. With no other option, the patient is forced to deviate from
the recommended course of treatment. This decision makes the patient more susceptible
to health complications that will later require readmission. The prior scenario is a regular
occurrence in many of these safety-net hospitals. As such, these hospitals typically have
higher readmissions rates than hospitals in more affluent communities.35

29

Id. at 3-4 (stating “CMS has made additional funding available for readmission reduction
strategies through initiatives, such as the Community-based Care Transitions Program and the
Partnership for Patients”).
30

Id. at 3.

31

Id. at 4 (arguing that indigent patients generally lack the resources to fill their prescriptions
resulting in an eventual readmission to the hospital they are initially discharged from).
32

See 42 U.S.C § 2717(a)(1)(B) (2010) (noting that nurse follow-ups have typically resulted in a
reduction in readmission rates because it allows hospitals to ensure that the patients are following
their discharge instructions properly).
33

See Baber v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 977 F.2d 872, 880 (4th Cir. 1992) (stating that “all Americans,
regardless of wealth or status, should know that a hospital will provide what services it can when
they are truly in physical distress” and stating that Congress enacted EMTALA to address its
concern with the practice of patient dumping) (quoting 131 Cong. Rec. S13904 (daily ed. Oct. 23,
1985) (statement of Sen. Durenberger)).
34

James, supra note 5, at 4.

35

Karen E. Joynt et al., Thirty-Day Readmission Rates for Medicare Beneficiaries by Race and Site
of Care, 305 JAMA 675, 675 (2011).
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iii. Expected Disproportionate Share Hospital Cuts As Well As Costs Associated with
Decreasing Readmissions May Jeopardize Access to Care.
Medicare does not provide any direct payment for strategies that may help these hospitals
reduce readmission rates.36 The cost of employing these strategies, coupled with the
reduced revenue from fewer readmissions, makes it less likely that attempts to reduce
readmissions will be cost efficient. The financial difficulties that hospitals will face are
not only tied to the HRRP of the Affordable Care Act; others provisions within the law
also stand to significantly contribute to financial hardship for safety-net hospitals.37
Currently many safety-net hospitals are funded by the federal government through the
Medicare Disproportionate Share Hospitals (DSH) payment program;38 however, the
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) expects a seventy-five percent
reduction in DHS payments by the beginning of the 2015 fiscal year.39 Through DSH
payments, hospitals have been able to improve the access to care for much of the indigent
population in this country.40 Significant cuts to DSH payments could create more of an
incentive for hospitals to alter the types of services they provide, focusing on those
services that are more profitable and less often used.41 The harm is that less profitable
services that have proven long-term benefits to a patient’s health, such as preventive
screening, could be significantly cut. An emphasis on preventive care, however, is
important because it will help stifle the rising healthcare costs for patients by improving
the likelihood that life-threatening conditions will be detected much sooner.42
B. Financial Strain Caused by the HRRP as well as Other Provisions of the
Affordable Care Act Will Lead to Larger Problems, Including a Decrease in
Services or Closure of Facilities.
The Committee of Medicaid and Medicare Services predicted that beginning this fiscal
year, at least 2,225 hospitals will be penalized $227 million dollars because of excess
readmissions.43 As with any other financially strained institution, when there are added
expenses, cuts must be made. While it would be difficult to speculate precisely how
these hospitals will absorb the added expenses, cuts to staffing and supporting services
are likely possibilities.44 Although a reduction in operating costs does not necessarily
36

See Sweider, supra note 8, at 376 (arguing that these hospitals will be hit doubly hard, losing
reimbursements for readmissions while no longer getting the Disproportionate Share Hospital
(DSH) payments to which they are accustomed).
37

See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(5)(F)(i) (2010).

38

See Peters, supra note 22, at 1.

39

42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(5)(F)(i) (2010).

40

See Peters, supra note 22, at 1.

41

Arnold M. Epstein et al., The Relationship between Hospital Admission Rates and
Rehospitalizations, 365 New Eng. J. Med. 2287, 2287 (2011) (noting that among the money saving
initiatives that struggling hospitals could adopt is offering more profitable services to patients).
42

See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13 (2010) (providing that private insurers are required to cover screening
services and preventive treatments which have been given a recommendation of “A” or “B” by the
U.S. Preventive Services Task Force).
43

James, supra note 5, at 3.

44

Bronstad, supra note 24.
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imply a reduction in the quality of treatment, it does create the potential that such an
outcome may occur.
Faced with mounting debts and added expenses from the new penalties associated with
the HRRP, hospital that cannot compete in the readmission game will likely cut cost by
offering fewer services to their patients or shedding facilities.45 These hospitals may no
longer have the resources to invest in innovative technology that is aimed at enhancing
treatment and patient care.46 Hospitals, with mounting financial pressure from HRRP
penalties, may also cut critical services that could comprise the quality of care provided
to patients.47
To avoid penalties hospitals may attempt to avoid treating elderly patients. The sickest and
oldest patients place an increasing burden on hospitals trying to reduce their readmission
rates because, generally, these patients are readmitted more often.48 Currently, more
than six million elderly Americans suffer from chronic medical conditions that require
long-term homecare as well as frequent physician visits.49 Long-term care, by its nature,
involves many providers and several different types of treatment. For example, hip
fractures are among the most common orthopedic injuries in the elderly population.50
They are debilitating injuries that require surgical intervention and inpatient care of,
what are more often than not, patients with many chronic medical issues.51 These
patients require orthopedic intervention for surgery, medical intervention for health
status monitoring, physical therapy during and after hospital discharge, as well as
regular follow-up with their primary care physician.52 Such patients often require
multiple readmissions for pain management, infection, and rehabilitation that arise as a
result of their injury and made worse by their pre-injury healthcare status.53 Fully aware
of this reality, hospital may be less inclined to treat elderly patients to avoid the potential
for facing readmission penalties.54
Another tactic that hospitals may employ is manipulating billing information to
circumvent some key measures of readmissions in order to avoid being penalized by
the HRRP.55 For example, while under observational care, a patient is provided with
outpatient services to determine whether hospitalization is required thereby changing
45

Suzanne Sataline, Cash-Poor Governments Ditching Public Hospitals, The Wall St. J., Aug. 29,
2010 (Health Industry Section).
46

Id.

47

Mark Levine, St. Vincent’s is the Lehman Brothers of Hospitals, N.Y. Mag., Oct. 17, 2010, http://
nymag.com/news/features/68991/.
48

Id.

49

H. Stephen Kaye, Long-Term Care: Who Gets It, Who Provides It, Who Pays, and How Much?,
Health Aff., 11 (2010).
50

Fractures of the Pelvis & Acetabulum, Ctrs. For Orthopedics, http://www.orthoassociates.com/
SP11B26/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2014).
51

Id.

52

Id.

53

Id.

54

Levine, supra note 47.

55

See Naylor, supra note 3 (discussing how coding allows hospitals to avoid or obscure
measurement of some hospitalizations).
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the patient’s designation from an inpatient to an outpatient.56 Prolonged use of this
designation allows hospitals to avoid a potentially necessary hospitalization, which
de facto reduces their readmission rate.57 Although this tactic is illegal and would
potentially comprise the quality of treatment provided to patients, this tactic would
reduce a hospital’s readmission rate.
Moreover, the HRRP presumes that penalties will prompt hospitals to improve patient
services and treatment facilities; however, since the penalty is capped annually at a
percentage of a hospital’s total Medicare payments, hospitals could bear the penalties
and avoid the high costs of implementing changes in their operations and services.58
Hospitals unable to sustain the costs associated with readmission penalties will be
forced to shut down.59 The remaining hospitals will be overwhelmed by the flux of new,
mostly indigent, patients left behind by the hospitals that shut down.60 Such a wave
would create overcrowded and understaffed hospitals where long waits and uneven care
become the standard.61

III. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
To ensure that the penalty associated with the HRRP are enforced consistently and fairly,
socio-economic status of patients and other patient population characteristics should
be taken into consideration when computing the acceptable readmission rates for each
hospital. The overall goal of the program is to eradicate the gaps that exist with patient
care as a means of reducing hospital readmissions. Subjecting all hospitals to the same
standards implies that all hospitals are subjected to similar patient populations and have
the same resources to manage their inpatient complications. While there are legitimate
concerns that adjusting for these sorts of factors may mask the potential disparities in
care for the disadvantaged, it is clear that this program’s intended model of enforcement
is flawed and ought to be adjusted appropriately. Additionally, the HRRP should not
do away with DHS payments at this time. DHS payments are vitally important for
increasing and maintaining access to care, as they fund hospitals that treat indigent
populations. Eliminating DHS payments creates incentive for hospitals to focus on more
profitable services, despite that they might be less commonly used by needy patients.
Overall, the ACA should ensure that hospitals provide the treatments that patients need,
not just the ones that are more economically beneficial for the hospital.
Currently, the HRRP is trying to accomplish too much all at once.62 The program
simultaneously gathers uniform data among hospitals, publicizes those results, and then

56

See id.

57

See id.

58

See id. (discussing how in some cases the cost of implementing these new readmission reduction
strategies would be greater than the penalty that would be imposed on them).
59

See Levine, supra note 47 (discussing the added pressures that hospitals would have to deal with
including growing costs, decreasing revenues, and unsustainable debt loads).
60

Id.

61

Id.

62

Sweider, supra note 8, at 382.
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dispenses out penalties to various hospitals.63 Given the relatively short time frame in
which providers must comply with the new regulations, such a process may lead to an
overextension of DHHS resources.64 Gathering more data on this issue is undeniably
crucial in appropriately resolving excess readmissions; however, the fact that hospital
readmission data will become public will inevitably penalize hospitals that require
more time to find a mechanism best suited for their particular situation. As such, a
sensible solution would be to lengthen the timetable in implement the HRRP. Delaying
its commencement would give Congress time to revisit and improve the program, while
also allowing hospitals a sufficient period to research and formulate their individuals
plans prior to placing their federal reimbursement dollars at jeopardy.

IV. CONCLUSION
Hospital readmission is an important and costly epidemic that needs to be addressed in
order to improve the healthcare system in this country. A system premised on financial
incentives for hospitals can be an effective solution to resolve this problem if governed
and implemented properly. As currently structured, however, the HRRP will not produce
the intended benefits on the delivery of healthcare in the United States. Moreover,
the program has a potential to have a number of negative consequences, including a
decrease in indigent access to care, a reduction in senior quality care, and increased
financial strains on hospitals.
The main problem with the HRRP is that it fails to appreciate the material differences in
the patient base of hospitals that contribute to disparities in readmission rates. There are
often factors entirely outside of the hospital’s control that, nonetheless, cause a patient to
be readmitted. Rather than assessing penalties purely by readmission rates, the program
ought to account for the processes and safeguards that hospitals have implemented in
addressing these challenges.
Applying the same standard to each hospital, without accounting for their inherent
differences, raises the potential that the existing disparities in healthcare system
will be magnified. With some common sense adjustments, however, the program’s
implementation could affect the positive change it was intended to have on the quality
of healthcare in the United States.

63

Id. at 385-86.

64

Id. at 382.
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